The phrase “True Will” is often used to indicate the specific and essential meaning of the concept of Will in Thelema, especially as in the Law of Thelema – “Do what though wilt, shall be the whole of the Law” (AL I:40) as opposed to the more general meaning of the word as it is used outside of Thelemica.

True Will

The phrase “True Will” does not appear in the Book of the Law however the phrase “Pure will” does (CCXX I:44) and for all intents and purposes the two are synonymous. Crowley’s various commentaries on the Book routinely use the phrase “True Will” rather than “Pure will”, but the two are equivalent.

The concept postulates that each individual has a unique and incommensurable inherent nature (which is identical to their “destiny”) that determines their proper course in life, that is the mode of action that unites their purest personal will with the postulated course that preexists for them in the universe.

The idea is that to the extent that one is pure in their will, one is carried along effortlessly by the momentum of the universe like an expert sailor allowing the current to carry the ship along its intended course with minimal effort. To the extent that one is not pure in their will, they are tossed about aimlessly like a piece of drift wood on a stormy sea. In other words, one’s effectiveness or impotence in life is determined by how purely they adhere to their True Will.

In general, it is supposed by contemporary Thelemites that no one can know the True Will of another, but in Crowley’s essay “The Secret Conference” (written under the pseudonym of Gerald Aumont, and prefaced to The Heart of the Master), he suggests that a technique may (indeed, must) be devised, by which a child’s True Will may be discovered at birth, or as early as possible in life, in order to permit the correct ordering of society. We can speculate that Crowley had an astrological method in mind, although subsequent historical developments may lead us to consider genomics as a better candidate for the hypothetical technique.

In Crowley’s ethical treatise “Duty”, he identifies True Will with the Nature of the individual. This capitalized “Nature” may be compared with the “Perfect Nature” of earlier Gnostic systems, which was another term for the personal daimon or augoeides, usually referenced by Crowley as the Holy Guardian Angel. (For this use of the term “Perfect Nature,” see Corbin’s Man of Light in Iranian Sufism.)

One can say the one’s True Will is pure by nature or that that their true Nature is their Pure Will.

“The Message of the Master Therion” (Liber II) is a seminal document that attempts to delineate the doctrine of True Will. By reference to “Liber Thisharb”, Liber II implies a theory of metempsychosis, whereby the individual True Will is the resultant of a person’s prior incarnations.

In “De Lege Libellum” (Liber CL), Crowley defines True Will as the will which does not “rest content with things partial and transitory, but … proceed[s] firmly to the End,” and in the same passage he identifies that “End” as the destruction of oneself in Love, the uniting of the self with the not-self resulting in the loss of the sense of individuality, as if the ego is a drop of water that is united with the ocean. In one sense, the drop is lost forever. In an other sense, the drop becomes none other than the ocean itself.

Pure Will

Although the phrase “True Will” does not appear on the Book of the Law, the phrase “pure will” does (CCXX I:44) and is referred to as being perfect (CCXX I:44-45) and “one Perfect and not two” (CCXX I:45).

Transcendent Will

The phrase “transcendent Will” also appears in Thelemic literature (The Law of Liberty Liber CL לענ De Lege Libellum and is used interchangeably with “True Will” and “Pure Will”.

Quotations on “Pure Will” from The Book of the Law, Liber Al Vel Legis CCXX

• For pure will, unassuaged of purpose, delivered from the lust of result, is in every way Perfect. (AL I:44)

• The Perfect and the Perfect are one Perfect and not two; nay, are none! (AL I:45)

Quotations on “True Will” from Aleister Crowley

• The most common cause of failure in life is ignorance of one’s own True Will, or of the means by which to fulfill that Will. – Magick, Book 4 pg.127

• A man who is doing his True Will has the inertia of the Universe to assist him. – Magick, Book 4 pg.128

• One can not do one’s True Will intelligently unless one knows what it is. – Magick, Book 4 pg.174

• Know firmly, O my Son, that the True Will connot err; for it is thine appointed Course in Heaven, in whose Order is Perfection. – Liber Aleph vel CXI – The Book of Wisdom or Folly pg.13

• True Will should spring, a fountain of Light, from within, and flow unchecked, seething with Love, into the Ocean of Life. – Little Essays Towards Truth pg.76

Quotations on “Transcendent Will” from Aleister Crowley

• Nerve thyself, then, to seek it and to do it. Naught can satisfy thee but the fulfillment of thy transcendent Will, that is hidden within thee. For this, then, up to arms! Win thine own Freedom for thyself! – The Law of Liberty Liber CL לענ De Lege Libellum pg.67

Relevant Topics

• Thelema
• Holy Guardian Angel
• Free Will
• Pure Will
• The Great Work

Source: Thelemapedia (currently offline – 30/12/2011)

 Book Study Plus: Roberto Assagioli’s The Act of Will Plus Real Life Application

The Center for Awakening announces the rescheduled start date for Book Study Plus, Roberto Assagioli’s The Act of Will, plus a Real Life Application.  It will begin on January 24, 2012 and end of April 3, 2012.  Participants in the Book Study Plus will study the book and carry out a self-chosen real life application over 10 weeks.  There will be weekly telphone conference calls on Tuesdays at 2 p.m. Eastern Time, 1 p.m. Central Time, Noon Mountain Time and 11 a.m. Pacific Time.

Each of the 10 weekly sessions will consist of readings, the conference calls, e-mails and use of our blog (psychosynthesiswis.blogspot.com) on which participants may comment.  All the telephone conference calls will be recorded and made available. Weekly e-mails from the facilitators will pose questions and/or comments to promote discussion and sharing.  Facilitators for the Book Study Plus are Hedwig Weiler, MSN, APRN-BC, LCSW and Carla Peterson, MS, LPC, SAC. Hedi and Carla are the Psychosynthesis Coordinators for the Center for Awakening.

Anyone interested in understanding the Will and how it works is invited to participate. We ask that each person make a commitment to participate in the entire book study. We aim to have 20 participants, and will go forward with the Book Study Plus if we have 10 participants. This should be an exciting and worthwhile project for those who want to explore and develop their capacity for efffective use of their will to make wise decisions and achieve goals.  Examples of Real Life Applications could include remodeling a room, learning or relearning a language, engaging in a political campaign, planning and taking a long bicycle trip, etc.

There will also be the option of individual consultation with Hedi or Carla for a moderate fee. Time for telephone or Skype consultation sessions can be arranged within the duration of the book study or after its conclusion.

To register, send an email to Carla Peterson at carla@centerforawakening.org  or carlapeterson@clearwire.net   In your e-mail include your name, address, a telephone number, and indicate what draws your interest to this book study at this time. We will send more specific information on conference calls, reading schedule, etc. to those who register.

For further information see the Center For Awakening website: http://www.centerforawakening.org/

• “A boy’s will is his life, and he dies when it is broken, as the colt dies in harness, taking a new nature in becoming tame.”
  by Henry Adams The Education of Henry Adams
• “Will to will! The Will must be: developed, grounded, re-oriented and used!”
  by Roberto Assagioli The Act of Will
• “Since the outcome of successful willing is the satisfaction of one’s needs, we can see that the act of will is essentially joyous. And the realization of … being a self … gives a sense of freedom, of power, of mastery which is profoundly joyous.”
  by Roberto Assagioli Purpose and the Creative Will
• “There is not great talent without great will power.”
  by Honore de Balzac
• “Nothing can withstand the power of the human will if it is willing to stake its very existence to the extent of its purpose.”
  by Benjamin Disraeli
• “The man who has submitted his will and purposes entirely to God, carries God with him in all his works and in all circumstances.”
  by Meister Eckhart
• “The education of the will is the object of our existence.”
  by Ralph Waldo Emerson
• “Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will.”
  by Mahatma Gandhi
• “It’s not that some people have willpower and some don’t. It’s that some people are ready to change and others are not.”
  by James Gordon
• “The will to act is a renewable resource.”
  by Al Gore

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Purpose and the Creative Will

Since the outcome of successful willing is the satisfaction of one’s needs, we can see that the act of will is essentially joyous. And the realization of … being a self … gives a sense of freedom, of power, of mastery which is profoundly joyous. (Roberto Assagioli)

Every choice or decision we make is an act of will. We might not be aware that we have chosen, and may even feel like a total victim with no choice at all. Nevertheless, wherever we are and whatever we are doing, it is our choice. Without making a choice, we could not stay where we are or move anywhere else. Without making a choice, we could not either stop what we are doing or continue doing it. Every time we make a choice, we perform an act of will. Our will power is the dynamic energy that brings us into this world and if we consciously connect with this energy it gives us the ability to be and do and become whatever we wish.

We have many different inner powers and the right use of these powers can enable us to make the best choices both for our own well-being and the world around us. We can only make these choices, however, through developing these inner powers in a balanced and conscious way. The discovery of our will and its subsequent training is the foundation of this work, which can be best achieved through direct experience. If we make a comparison with a car, the first thing we have to learn is that there is an engine through which we can choose to move the car. Then we have to find ways of using that engine so that we can travel in the direction that is best for us at any given moment.

Of course, a lot of the time our actual experience is very different from this. Even if we are aware we have a car, it certainly doesn’t feel like we are in the driving seat! We are drifting or muddling along as if we are the victims of our circumstances. We see ourselves as the victims of where we are or who we are, of poverty or depression, of failure or even success! We are the victims of other people who made us whatever we are, or stop us doing what we wish. We feel as if we are not really free to choose what we want. Since childhood we have been told by parents and teachers and other ‘well wishers’ that we need to face the ‘reality’ of life. The message, that we cannot have everything we want, easily becomes one that says we cannot have anything we want.

If someone asks us to do something, the two obvious responses are yes and no. We can say we will or we will not. Yet usually we have a third choice available to us – ‘not for now’. We do not have to limit ourselves by saying yes or no when ‘not for now’ is more appropriate. Sometimes it is right to make quick and immediate responses. The question at hand needs a fast response, or it is so obvious which choice is needed. Often, however, we can take the time to consider our choices and make them in a more centered, balanced way. The more consciousness we bring into our decisions, the more we are able to choose what are the right decisions for us.
In Psychosynthesis, we consider that any act of will actually takes place through six clear stages:

• investigation (finding out what it is we wish to do);
• deliberation (considering all the different things we wish to do at any time and selecting the acts most relevant to our current situation);
• decision (deciding upon the one act that is most important to us at the present time, and clearly formulating and stating this desire);
• affirmation (staying connected to this decision through constantly re-affirming that this choice is what we really desire to achieve);
• plan (thinking about the different ways we can actually make whatever it is happen);
• execution (doing it, finding ways of carrying out the intended plan, either in entirety or step by step.)

Every choice we make involves these six stages to a greater or lesser degree. It might be that for a particular choice we know what we want, hardly have to deliberate over it at all, and are able to quickly plan and execute the action necessary to succeed. For example, our choice to go to a nearby shop to purchase something we need. On the other hand, we might not really know what we want, and we might endlessly deliberate over the choices and never actually decide what to do. Or we might know exactly what we want and yet not know how to go about planning and executing the necessary actions. Our desire could be something well worked out, but for which the execution needs to take place at a particular time. If we choose a sunset, we will only be able to make it happen at the right time of day.

Whilst our acts of will always include all the six stages, they rarely do so in a linear fashion. For instance, whilst planning we may need to go back and deliberate further when we discover that we have not quite got the choice right. Often we need to keep going back to our choice to affirm it over and over. Constantly returning to the affirmation stage to focus on and strengthen our choices is usually a good technique as it reinforces the planning and execution of our desire.

We also have to consider that every choice we make affects everything and everyone else. If I choose to eat this particular orange right now, you will never be able to eat it either now or at any other time. That may not seem so serious – after all, there are plenty more oranges. In other circumstances, however, such knowledge takes on much more significance. For example, someone may choose to ignore their knowledge that lead-free petrol is better for the environment. That they continue buying leaded petrol seems to make no difference, because after all what difference can one person make? Yet in reality the situation will surely be worsening.

We must make our choices clearly and with heart, and be aware of this global effect, yet we must not allow such knowledge to make us impotent. Rather we must try to align ourselves with the flow of nature so that our choices add to rather than subtract from the evolution of consciousness on our planet.

The Stages of Willing

Although the process is, in actuality, continuous, as individuals we can experience the will as having four stages. The first stage could be described as ‘having no will’. It is a common human experience to feel like a victim to outside forces, other people or the circumstances in which we find ourselves. At many times in our lives we all experience a sense of impotency, frustration and an inability to act. Instead of doing what we wish, we become totally reactive to the circumstances or the environment. We feel as if what we are, and what we are able to do or not do, is totally dependant upon what happens outside of us.

At these times we act like a victim to our repressed urges and desires, to basic drives, or to people or events outside of us. When we are coming from this state, when we believe ourselves to be ‘will-less’, our primary motivation is desire. We do not see ourselves as having any control, but instead experience ourselves as ‘slaves of desire’, whether we are fully conscious of this or not. Our one wish is to get our desires met and to avoid as much struggle, effort and pain as possible. If we have to manipulate people we will so long as our desires are met. As we reduce our responsibility in this way we become even more a victim and we can easily sink further into this deadening trap.

In reality, however horrible the situation you are in may truly be, you can make of it what you will. You could be unjustly imprisoned and, as a victim, spend your days bemoaning your fate. You might plot revenge on those who unjustly imprisoned you, those to whom you are a victim. Or you could undertake some other plan of action – you could meditate, write, use the time to make detailed observations of yourself or your fellow inmates, and so on. There are many stories of people doing just this. Assagioli, the founder of Psychosynthesis, when imprisoned by Mussolini, spent his days developing and ‘fine-tuning’ his system of psychology. In other words, Assagioli, in this unjust situation, chose to take responsibility for himself and not sink into a victim role.

Of course, we do not have to be in such an extreme situation to feel like a victim. Think of times right now when you feel like a victim. Perhaps you are a victim to your boss at work, or to your partner, your parents, or even your children! Perhaps you feel like you are a victim to the unjust society in which you live. The key to releasing yourself from this victim consciousness is to realise that, whatever is happening to you, you are creating the situation. We all re-create our worlds afresh each and every moment.
The next stage of the will process is coming to an understanding that ‘will exists’. We might still feel we cannot actually do it, but we know, whatever it is, that it is possible. We realise we have a choice. This choice in any situation is always, as we have already discussed, ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘not for now’. Of course, we may have reached this stage with a part of our personality but be less developed in other parts. Even if this stage of the will is only partially experienced, however, it leads to a shift in awareness from unconscious desires to active, conscious wishes. We might still feel separate, but there is a beginning of responsibility, the knowledge that some choice is possible. We are starting to develop our personal power.

Once we know that the will exists we are able to start working on developing it within ourselves. There are two basic aspects of will power that we can develop and, in Psychosynthesis, we call these ‘the strong will’ and ‘the skilful will’. Strong will is the energy to choose whilst skilful will is the knowledge of how to use that energy. The strong will is like a car, the skilful will the driver. We can learn to develop both strong and skilful will. In most of us, one will be developed more than the other, but there is usually room for improvement in both.

One of the best ways to develop the strong will is to find ways in your daily life of being strong willed. You may hate washing up, for instance, so to develop your will you could choose to do it regularly and with positive attention. You could choose to make physical acts into acts of will. If you were gardening, for instance, you could do it consciously, being aware that each spade full of earth you move, or each flower you plant is an act of will. You might do aerobic exercises, or dancing, and do this not so much just for the exercise value, but because each movement you make you are consciously choosing to make. You could choose to read stories or watch television programmes about great heroic deeds performed against all odds. You can easily devise other techniques for strengthening the strong will, but above all perform these techniques playfully, cheerfully and with interest.

You can also develop skilful will through acts in your daily life. When washing up, for example, you might ask yourself what is the most skilful way to do this, to make it most efficient and with the least expenditure of unnecessary energy? Should you wash the greasy pans or the glasses first? The development of skill is accomplished not only through what you actually do but through the attitude you have to the act being performed. It’s not what you do, it’s how you do it. Part of this skill is being aware of how much energy you put into doing something. If you put in too little energy, it’s like using a spoon to move a mountain; using too much energy, like taking a forklift truck to an egg! Later in this chapter we will discuss further the technique of using daily life to help us develop all aspects of the will.

Once we have developed our will, at least to some degree, we pass to the next stage of the will which in Psychosynthesis we call ‘having a will’. When this stage or level is attained, it can be experienced consciously or unconsciously, but it happens, usually, through a gradual awakening. We start to become a ‘director’ in our life. When we have chosen to play a particular role, we hold both an awareness of the self or centre, and the role that we are playing. We switch between them as appropriate.

At this stage of the will, that is when we consciously realise we have a will, there is a distinct move towards integration. There is less fragmentation and more clarity of choice. We realise that we have a will and we can choose with it. We start to feel more connected to our ‘purpose’ for being alive on this planet at this time. From this place we truly take responsibility for our acts. Of course, we may not be responsible and conscious in this way all of the time, but the amount of time we spend in this state gradually starts to increase.

In Psychosynthesis we call the fourth and final stage of the evolution of the will in the individual ‘being will’. When this stage is reached there is alignment with the transpersonal Self and the deepest, most spiritual aspects of will. We are connected with our innermost understanding. We can reach this level of consciousness through meditation, through silence, or simply through turning inwards and allowing this energy of the Self to permeate through us. Once we have reached this stage, even for a moment, it is inevitable that we will desire to express this deep and meaningful connection in the outside world. Indeed, it is the sign of true ‘spiritual attainment’ not when the person involved can sit for hours in a yoga posture, or perform ‘miraculous’ feats, but rather when this energy is expressed in the world in a way that brings healing and sustenance to his or her fellow beings.

Spiritual Purpose

When we start using our will from a centred place, we find we are the source or cause of what happens in our life and are not just an effect or victim to circumstances. We discover there is a distinction between our ‘true will’ or Purpose, which can be defined as the will of the Self, and the energies, such as drives and self-centred desires, that come from subpersonalities. Of course, this is not to say that subpersonalities should not get what they want, their needs have to be met fully before they can truly be transformed. But their wishes are inevitably in conflict with the wishes of other subpersonalities. We experience no such conflicts with the ‘true will’ for this originates from the deepest, innermost core of our being.

We can only truly discover our true will or Purpose when we consciously and actively take steps towards its manifestation. That may seem obvious, but too often we forget this and, instead of following our path a step at a time, we try to leap ahead, not paying attention to what is happening in the present moment. The next step is always of utmost importance, and, in actuality, the only step we can make. Even physically if we try to take four steps at once we are more likely to fall over than succeed. This is even truer when we are talking about inner Purpose. We find it is easier to stay on our path if we pay attention to our immediate position, rather than worrying about something way ahead.

We may have little or no idea of what our true will or Purpose is, but if we reflect upon what Purpose means to us, and what we would like to manifest in our lives that has ‘real meaning’, we can start getting at least an inkling of it. You might like to try some reflective, receptive and creative meditation on ‘Purpose’. Remember that Purpose always follows the rule of non-interference – it cannot be your real Purpose if it involves you interfering with or altering someone else’s Purpose.

When we have connected to our Purpose – through meditation as suggested above, or through any of the other methods used in Psychosynthesis or other ways to self-realization, the next step is to decide how to manifest this Purpose. The techniques for grounding that we have already discussed can be most helpful in this, but the most important thing is to find your own individual ways of manifesting your Purpose. This is where it is often most helpful to have a good guide who will be able to not only help you connect with your Purpose but also help you to find ways to manifest it.

The Good Will

The will is not only active, not only involved with ‘doing’. You could choose, for example, to just be, to pass some time ‘doing nothing’. Indeed, one of the greatest distortions in our thinking about will power is to believe it has to be an effort or strenuous, or that it depletes or uses up energy in some way. On the contrary, when we make conscious, definite acts of will rather than ending up with less energy, we feel energized, more alive, more ‘present’ in the world.

We need to be flexible and be able to find a balance between active and passive acts of will. Both can require strong and skilful will. To say ‘no’ to something, for instance, might require a tremendous act of courage if friends are encouraging you to do it. Or to exhibit patience in waiting for something you madly desire can require great reserves of strong will. The more centred we become, the more able are we to make acts of will, either active or passive, strong or skilful, as the situation requires.

One result of moving towards our centre and making our acts of will more conscious and purposeful is that we find there is another aspect of the will, sometimes called ‘the good will’. Acts of will that are made from the heart, that are filled with sympathy, love, understanding and warmth, are all manifestations of the good will. When we have good will towards someone, whether we act upon it or not, we are connected the energy of the will with the energy of love.

Psychosynthesis theory describes the good will as a synthesis of the archetypes or energies of love and will. An act of good will made towards someone is a dynamic and joy filled process that fosters understanding and co-operation. When we tune into the good will we recognize that whatever we do, it is part of the greater whole of human relations. The good will has also been described as ‘love in action’. In terms of human relations, so long as we only do to others what we would have them do to us, we are tuning into the energy of the good will. The good will, however, is not just being soft and nice, it is dynamic and active.

Imagine what we would be like if we had no good will at all. We would not be able to actively express love, we would take actions that promoted our own interests at the expense of others, we might be suspicious and defensive, judgemental, prejudiced, indifferent to the suffering of others, isolated and so on. On the other hand, we could have too much good will. People would walk all over us, or we might be overly helpful to the point of interference, or we might never be able to say no. We would be so nice we would be really sickly.

With just the right amount of good will, however, we create a true balanced between both love and will, we are co-operative and helpful and exhibit all the qualities of ‘right human relations’. At each and every moment, all of us have the choice as to whether we want to exhibit good will or not. As always we have three options – yes, no, or not for now. Right now we can choose which of these options we wish to take. If we choose to say ‘yes’ to the good will, there will naturally be times when we do not succeed. But whenever this happens, we can always choose to come back to it, centring ourselves again and becoming once more infused with the energy of good will.

The Will in Daily Life

In our daily lives we have lots of opportunities for developing all aspects of the will. Perhaps as a definite act of will we might rise in the morning a quarter of an hour earlier. If we have a special reason for doing this it is, of course, an act of will. But we can also choose to do it simply as a way of training our will, or of developing our power. Each time we utilize a situation from daily life in this way, we strengthen ourselves and become more able to then use our will when we really need it.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, we might develop strong will through doing the washing up, and skilful will through doing it in an effective way. It might be an act of good will to do it for someone else. Whatever we do in this way to develop our will power we can do with an attitude of joy and interest. We will find then that we will accomplish not only these ‘training’ tasks but all the other tasks in our life with greater effectiveness and ease, without tension and exhaustion.

It is also worth remembering that everyone with whom we come into contact can help us in developing our will, even without their knowing it. If another driver cuts you up, or the traffic is heavy, for instance, it is an opportunity to develop patience and serenity. If your boss at work is always dominating and short with you, you can use his energy to help you develop your force and proficiency. We best succeed in these ways through our attitudes and awareness. We can see our life as a laboratory in which we can both experiment with and develop our will.

The best ways to develop the will through daily life are those that we discover and invent for ourselves. This might include doing something we wouldn’t normally do, or not doing something we normally do. We could, for example, do something today we were planning to leave until tomorrow, or leave until tomorrow something we believe to be urgent. Whatever we choose to do, it is important to do it simply because we want to do it. Then we will find our will power is increasing for once the energy of the will is in motion it generates more and more energy. If we don’t try too hard, but let our desire to be successful flow from our true sense of self, then we succeed with clarity and ease.

Exercise: The Value of the Will

Relax and centre yourself. Think of times in your life when you have missed an opportunity or caused pain to yourself or someone else through your lack of will. Picture these events as vividly as possible and allow the associated feelings to affect you.
Now write down a list of these times in your life with which you have just connected. Let yourself really desire to change yourself so that you have more will.

Reflect on all the opportunities and benefits there would be both for yourself and others if your will was strengthened. Think clearly what these advantages would be, then write them down. Allow the feelings aroused by these anticipated advantages to really affect you. Feel the joy that these opportunities could give you, the satisfaction you would feel if you were stronger willed. Let yourself really feel your desire to become stronger in this way.

Finally picture yourself as having a strong will. Imagine yourself acting in every situation with firm decisions, focused intention, and clear awareness. Visualize yourself walking, talking, sitting and simply being in a way that exhibits your mastery over the will. You are strong, yet subtle, firm yet kind, acting with skill and discrimination.
Realize you can use this technique to strengthen your will whenever you choose.

Dennis Wier’s trance model uses term wyrd as a measure of the power of a trance to resist any change in the effects of the trance.

For further information see the Wikipedia entry William James.

CHAPTER XVI – WILL TRAINING

The will used to be thought of as a separate faculty of a man, that must give its fiat, like the president’s signature to a bill, before any act became possible. But it was long ago noticed that so simple an act as winking did not fall within this definition. We now use the term “will” only in connection with action that is prompted by clearly thought-out motives.

Several facts are implied by this way of looking at the matter. In the first place, if we are going to think out our motives, evidently we must possess a certain stock of motives, among which to choose. These past motives that we have used before under similar circumstances are our memories. But they are more than things recalled; they are things recalled with favor. They are memories of past desires that became habits. We recall our desires more easily than our repulsions.

So this is the way we will: Out of our stock of past choices the mind finds alternatives for present choice; it chooses among these and as soon as it chooses, acts accordingly. Those choices that have been most often favored appear most attractively, to be chosen again. Yet they are not inevitably chosen. The man can still deliberate, he can assort them according to their value. If he will do this, if he will think long enough and impartially enough to discover the right name for each, he will choose the best and will act for the best.

William James illustrated this fact by the man who has been a drunkard. He goes by a saloon, and as he passes memories rush to his attention, predominantly the memories of past desire. But he is not necessarily doomed. He finds himself naming and classifying these impulses. If he thinks of this as an opportunity to test a new brand of whiskey, or to be sociable with his friends, or to stimulate his good resolves by a parting glass, he is lost, but if he sees clearly that a drink involves being a drunkard, then he is on the road to salvation. Every accumulated memory of a victory moves his feet nearer to permanent safety.

Let us for clearness of thought set down the three most important words in the study of will : Habits, Deliberation, Action. *

THE RELATION OF HABITS TO WILL

We spoke above of the way evil habits bind the will, so that it is difficult to get free after many foolish choices have been made. On the contrary, how hopeful is the situation in the life of the child who, before the time of strong determining has come, has been moulded into so many right and pleasant habits that they form a goodly company of memories, that are motives, from which he may choose.

Our task with children is to multiply their presuppositions, those experiences of doing things in the right way which will ever after clamor in the field of attention as regular choices. We know what some of these are: the control of the ordinary muscular movements, to stand, walk and govern the body gracefully, to manage and modulate the voice, to marshal one’s thoughts readily. All those imply a life of great physical freedom in early youth, accompanied by thorough muscular training.

Evidently habit must go even further. It must involve the control of the feelings. The young child is abandoned to his feelings, of every sort. They are a mob who conquer him at every turn. If, as we have said, the will is a choice among past desires, then out of that mob rulers should have been appointed and others to serve. Anger, jealousy, curiosity in childhood are impulsive, irrational and quite unrestrained. But they cannot always remain so. To will implies not only the alliance with noble desires, but the inhibiting of ignoble ones. And the best result has come when the alliance overshadows the inhibition. We may, James tells us, repress or substitute. In teaching school you may draw the attention of your pupils from an attractive occurrence outside by bellowing at them, and they will attend; this is inhibition. Or you can put upon the blackboard such an attractive sketch that they will forget what is outside; that is substitution. Since out of the heart are the issues of life, thus to depend upon the expulsive power of a new affection is a very fine art in child training.

There is the greatest room for the training of the sentiments. We must not merely habituate our children to right doing, but the doing of right must at all times be associated so far as possible with pleasure, with love, with joyous service if we are, as Bushnell so beautifully said, “surely to implant the angel in the man.”

THE RELATION OF DELIBERATION TO WILL

We have implied that to deliberate among possible choices is to classify them. Classifying gives an opportunity for a measurement of values. We see, therefore, the need of developing moral thoughtfulness. The moral judgment that results from moral thoughtfulness and trained feelings we call Conscience. We used to think it a separate faculty. We called it “the voice of God in the soul of man.” If we conceived the will as a monarch on his throne, then conscience was the good angel who bent over his shoulder and whispered counsel in his ear. But even the theologian -acknowledges that while conscience at its best is the Inner Light, yet practically a man’s conscience at any given time is simply the expression of the best that is known to him. And while such knowledge is partly his own responsibility, it is evidently partly the responsibility of those who were his teachers. He was not born in possession of the Ten Commandments.

Real moral thoughtfulness implies that we give the child time and room to do his thinking. We must not be sudden, nor jerky, nor hieratical. Wherever possible we should offer him an alternative, so that he may become familiar with the possibility of choice. We should urge him to go apart when he is agitated or about to collide with us or another, and command his feelings and seek the better reason. When he is not likely to do himself or anybody else much damage, he should be allowed the precious experience of learning from his mistakes. Unless he may he never really has free will. It takes time to grow a conscience.

THE WILL IN ACTION

We can now see a little more clearly in what a strong will consists. A noisy lad with uncontrolled impulses does not possess a strong will. .A child who resists commands to the degree that he does not respond when punished is not necessarily strong in will ; since all he does is to resist, his will is purely negative and fruitless. It is evidently a mistake to restrict our idea of will power to the man who can resist great temptation; the man who, because of hereditary tendencies to temperance and early training in abstinence, can pass a saloon without any desire to go inside, is a better example of a well-trained will, which disposed of that enemy before it raised its head Let us laud struggle, and praise the man who masters himself in the face of temptation, but let us covet rather to discipline children who, as Whitman said, ” lift that level and pass beyond.”

DEFECTIVE WILLS

Two special abnormal types appear frequently among children.

One is the child of explosive will. He acts on instinct or instant impulse and gives little or no time to deliberation. Inhibition is practically unknown to such a child. He answers vigorously to the first call that seizes his attention, and since he seldom foresees it is hard to prophesy what he will do next. Evidently such a child must frequently be checked when he is about to embark upon a new activity, and given a chance to analyze and perhaps explain aloud its reasonableness or unreasonableness. He must be shown both that he loses much that is worth while because he does not give it time to gain his attention and that he can gain much more that is good out of that which he chooses if he will take time to go about it in the best way. It may be necessary sometimes to penalize such a child by obliging him to carry each separate choice to completion before springing to another, and to satisfy him of the benefit of deliberation and perseverance by giving him the privilege of earning the greater reward which comes from such perseverance. The treatment required may be summed up in this word of caution: “My son, you must take plenty of time to decide, and you must stick to your decisions when made.” This of course does not apply to decisions to do wrong. The peril of such a will is that it is easily influenced in wrong directions. Our work here is, as G. H. Dix says,” to train the possessor of an explosive will to prudence.”

The other type is the obstructed will. Its “function is smothered in surmise,” as Shakespeare said. Of this type the most trying is the obstinate child. Such a child is not so active as he is “set.” The idea of opposition enters his mind and he insists on carrying it to the end. This kind of child is best treated not by counter-opposition. What he usually needs is not to be conquered but to be helped. Often he would like to be willing. But he thinks he has been injured; he believes he has been slighted; or he simply feels out of sorts. His gloom should be met with inconquerable cheeriness, and with pleasant humor. The sulkiness can usually be ignored. A word of approval may put him on good terms with himself as well as with ourself. Sometimes a new line of thought or course of action will carry him along with you. The suggestion of helpfulness to yourself may at once remove his suspiciousness and enable him to express the friendliness which he feels at heart. A good deal of love will conquer a good deal of stubbornness.

HOW A CHILD ACHIEVES FREEDOM

The child seems to pass through three stages in his will development.

First, is the stage of command. The mother, in her process of training the child in good and safe habits, must give many explicit directions. She shows him how and patiently helps him to form ideas of useful actions and to carry them out. But she must also, for his protection, restrain him from many harmful practices and she must do this by negative commands. In many ways, then, this is the repressive stage of will.

Second, is the stage of co-operation. Just as soon as possible (much sooner than many parents realize) comes the time when the child can work under direction and control, in co-operation with his mother. There are now fewer commands, and more frequent invitations and suggestions. “Let us do” is an admirable phrase to use very often. During this time more freedom may be allowed the child, and the parent is more anxious to find the right spirit than to expect perfection of execution.

Then we come to the stage of self-discipline. Control now passes from without within. The youth says, as Jesus said in the temple, “I must.” Commands and invitations are now superseded by inner promptings.” It is the highest stage of voluntary action, because in it is expressed the whole personality, self-directed, self-controlled, self -disciplined.”

THE CHILD’S WILL AND THE PARENT’S WILL

It requires great wisdom to recognize and help the child through these stages. We are so sure of our own adult wisdom and so fearful of the mistakes that the child may make in his ignorance and his wilfulness, that we forget that our wills are only sponsors and proxies for his, until his is established in power. Or, we may make the contrary mistake, and spoil a child by letting him free before he is wise or worthy to be free, and so let him become a man of mere impulse and wilfulness. Each stage must be experienced and passed through. The right attitude for the parent is to work as a patient craftsman with the child through each period, while at the same time anticipating the next with prophetic and providing mind.

SUMMARY

Will training embodies these factors:

1. Furnishing the child with an abundance of good ideas.
2. Building these into a stock of good habits.
3. Training him to select thoughtfully from his past ideas and habits in making his present choices.
4. Associating his right choices so far as is possible with pleasant consequences, by connecting them with his interests, so that they may become the favored choices whenever he makes a new decision.
5. Insisting that the precipitate child shall take time to deliberate and shall not vacillate after he has chosen.
6. Helping the obstinate child through affectionate cheerfulness, sidetracking some of his difficulties by diversion and aiding him to conquer others by co-operation.
7. Working first through command, then through suggestion and finally through encouragement, as the child in turn responds to these incentives.
8. Giving the youth room to make choices and to live his own life.

READING REFERENCES

Simple statements about will-training are rare. Chapter IX of Dix’s “Child Study with Special Reference to the Teaching of Religion” is such a statement. There is a very good one in Chapter IX of Holmes’ “Principles of Character Making.” The psychology of the will is treated at length in Chapter XXVI of James’ “Psychology” and much more briefly in his “Talks to Teachers.” Mumford’s “The Dawn of Character” has two helpful chapters, the seventh on the development of the will, and the eighth on will-training.

Will Parfitt’s Concept of the Will

See: Purpose and the Creative Will

Selected Works

• Psychosynthesis: The Elements and Beyond ISBN 0955278600

External Links

• Psychosynthesis and Kabbalah with Will Parfitt
• PS Avalon Publishing

“WILL is the perfect name for what we are doing”, states Rhys, “It means several things, all of which are accurate, I see art as something reasonably permanent something that, if you die tomorrow, your art will live on. In some ways it is a will or a testament. We like to think of it as an epitaph in some degree. It encompasses every meaning of the word which is why we chose it. Inner-will, spirit, strength, these types of things.”

External Links

• Will Information on Mindphase.com
• Interview with Rhys Fulber

WILL, in philosophy. The “Problem of Freedom” provides in reality a common title under which are grouped difficulties and questions of varying and divergent interest and character. These difficulties arise quite naturally from the obligation, which metaphysicians, theologians, moral philosophers, men of science, and psychologists alike recognize, to give an account, consistent with their theories, of the relation of man’s power of deliberate and purposive activity to the rest of the universe. In the main, no doubt, the problem is a metaphysical problem, and has its origin in the effort to reconcile that belief in man’s freedom which is regarded by the unsophisticated moral consciousness as indisputable, with a belief in a universe governed by rational and necessary laws. But the historical origin of the questions at issue is to be sought rather in theology than in metaphysics, while the discovery made from time to time by men of science of the inapplicability of natural laws or modes of operation (which they have been accustomed to regard as of universal range and necessity) to the facts or assumed facts of human activity, is a constant source of fresh discussions of the problem. Similarly the modern attempt upon the part of psychology to analyse (under whatever limitations and with whatever object of inquiry) all the forms and processes of human consciousness has inevitably led to an examination of the consciousness of human freedom: while the postulate of most modern psychologists that conscious processes are not to be considered as removed from the sphere of those necessary causal sequences with which science deals, produces, if the consciousness of freedom be admitted as a fact of mental history, the old metaphysical difficulty in a new and highly specialized form.

There is some ground nevertheless for maintaining, contrary to much modern opinion, that the controversy is fundamentally and in the main a moral controversy. It is true that the precise relation between the activities of human wills and other forms of activitin the natural world is a highly speculative problem and one with which the ordinary man is not immediately concerned. It is true also that the ordinary moral consciousness accepts without hesitation the postulate of freedom,. and is unaware of, or imperfectly acquainted with, the speculative difficulties that surround its possibility. Moreover, much work of the highest importance in ethics in modern as well as ancient times has been completed with but scanty, if any, reference to the subject of the freedom of the will, or upon a metaphysical basis compatible with most of the doctrines of both the rival theories. The determinist equally with the libertarian moral philosopher can give an account of morality possessing internal coherence and a certain degree of verisimilitude. Yet it may be doubted (1) whether the problem would ever have arisen at all except for the necessity of reconciling the theological and metaphysical hypotheses of the omniscience and omnipotence of God with the needs of a moral universe: and (2) whether it would retain its perennial interest if the incursions of modern scientific and psychological inquiry into the domain of human consciousness did not appear to come into conflict from time to time with the presuppositions of morality. The arguments proceeding from either of the disputants by means of which the controversy is debated may be largely or almost wholly speculative and philosophical. But that which produces the rival arguments is primarily a moral need. And there are not wanting signs of a revival in recent years of the earlier tendency of philosophical speculation to subordinate the necessities of metaphysical, scientific and even psychological inquiries to the prima facie demands of the moral consciousness.

There is no trace of the emergence of the problem of freedom in any intelligible MIL distinct form in the minds of early Greek physicists or philosophers. Their doctrines were mainly based upon a belief in the government of the universe by some form of physical necessity, and though different opinions might prevail as to the mode of operation of the various forms of physical necessity the occasional recognition of non-material contributory causes never amounted to a recognition of the independence of human volition or intelligence. Nor can it be seriously maintained that the problem of freedom in the form in which it is presented to the modern mind ever became the subject of debate in the philosophy of Socrates, Plato or Aristotle. It is true that Socrates brought into prominence the moral importance of rational and intelligent conduct as opposed to action which is the result of unintelligent caprice. Moral conduct was, according to Socrates, the result of knowledge while it is strictly impossible to do wrong knowingly. Vice, therefore, is the result of ignorance and to this extent Socrates is a determinist. But the subsequent speculations of Aristotle upon the extent to which ignorance invalidates responsibility, though they seem to assume man’s immediate consciousness of freedom, do not in reality amount to very much more than an analysis of the conditions ordinarily held sufficient to constitute voluntary or involuntary action. The further question whether the voluntary acts for which a man is ordinarily held responsible are really the outcome of his freedom of choice, is barely touched upon, and most of the problems which surround the attempt to distinguish human agency from natural and necessary causation and caprice or chance are left unsolved. For Aristotle remained content with a successful demonstration of the dependence of “voluntariness” as an attribute of conduct upon knowledge and human personality. And though ultimately the attribution of responsibility for conduct is further limited to actions which are the result of purposive choice (1rpoaipeoi.), Aristotle appears to waver between a view which regards 7rpoaipecns as involving an ultimate choice between divergent ends of moral action and one which would make it consist in the choice of means to an end already determined. A similar absence of discussion of the main problem at issue is noticeable in Plato. It is true that in a famous passage in the tenth book of the Republic (x. 617 ff.) he seems to make human souls responsible through their power of choice for the destinies which they meet with during their respective lives. But, as with Socrates, their power of making a right choice is limited by their degree of knowledge or of ignorance, and the vexed question of the relation of this determining intelligence to the human will is left unsolved. With the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies the problem as it shapes itself for the consideration of the modern world begins to appear in clearer outlines. Stoic loyalty to a belief in responsibility based on freedom of choice appeared difficult to reconcile with a belief in an all-pervading Anima Mundi, a world power directing and controlling actions of every kind. And though the Stoic doctrine of determinism did not, when applied to moral problems, advance much beyond the reiteration of arguments derived from the universal validity of the principles of causality, nor the Epicurean counter-assertion of freedom avoid the error of regarding chance as a real cause and universal contingency as an explanation of the universe, it was nevertheless a real step forward to perceive the existence of the problem. Moreover, the argument by means of which Chrysippus endeavoured to prove the compatibility of determinism with ethical responsibility is in some respects an anticipation of modern views. For the distinction between main and contributory causes of conduct (causae adjuvantes and causae principales – the a’reov and vvairwwv of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy) preserved the possibility of regarding character, the main cause, as the responsible and accountable element in morality. And there is much that is anticipatory of modern libertarian views in the psychological argument by which Carneades attempted at once to avoid the Epicurean identification of will with chance, and to prove the rationality of choice, undetermined by any external or antecedent necessity, as an explanation of human actions Xxviii. 21 a apparent to its fullest extent. The Christian doctrine christianity. of the Creation at once challenged the pantheistic presuppositions of Hellenic thought and reinforced the belief already existing in will as a real cause. At the same time the dualism involved in the simultaneous acceptance of an optimistic account of the origin and nature of the universe (such as is implied in Christian theology) and a belief in the reality of moral evil witnessed to by the Christian doctrine of Redemption, intensified the difficulties already felt concerning man’s responsibility and God’s omnipotence. Neoplatonic philosophy had been in the main content either to formulate the contradiction or to deny the reality of one of the opposing terms. And traces of Neoplatonic influence, more especially as regards their doctrine of the unreality of the material and sensible world, are to be found everywhere in the Christian philosophers of Alexandria, preventing or impeding their formulation of the problem of freedom in its full scope and urgency. St Augustine was, perhaps, the first thinker to face, though not to solve, the true theological and moral difficulty inherent in Christian thought. Two lines of thought are to be traced in the most implacable hostility and contradiction throughout his system. On the one hand no thinker reiterates or emphasizes more cogently the reality of individual responsibility and of will. He affirms the priority of will to knowledge and the dependence of consciousness upon physical attention. He asserts .also the fact that our human power of receiving divine illumination (i.e. a capacity of spiritual insight in no sense dependent upon the creative activity of the intellect) is conditioned by our spontaneous acts of faith. And he finds in the existence of divine foreknowledge no argument for the impotence or determined character of human acts of will. The timeless foreknowledge of the Deity foresees human actions as contingent, not as causally determined. But when Augustine is concerned to reconcile the reality of individual freedom with humanity’s universal need of redemption and with the absolute voluntariness of Divine Grace, he is constrained to contradict most of those postulates of which in his advocacy of libertarianism he was an eager champion. He limits the possession of freedom to Adam, the first man, who, by abusing his prerogative, has corrupted the human race. Man as he now is cannot do otherwise than evil. Inherited incapacity for the choice of good is the punishment for Adam’s misuse of freedom. The possibility of redemption depends upon the bestowal of Divine Grace, which, because it is in no instance deserved, can be awarded or withdrawn without injustice. And because Adam’s choice necessitates punishment it follows that in some instances Divine Grace can never be bestowed. Hence arises in Augustine’s system the doctrine of Predestination. From the theological standpoint every individual is predestined either by his natural birthright to evil or by Divine Grace to good, and the absolute foreknowledge and omnipotence of God excludes even the possibility of any initiative on the part of the individual by means of which he might influence God’s timeless choice.

The medieval treatment of the problem follows in the main Augustinian or Aristotelian traditional lines of thought, though successive thinkers arrive at very diverse conclusions. Thomas Aquinas, for example, develops the Platonic Scholas- argument which proves the dependence of the will ticism. upon the intellect and makes the identification of morality with knowledge. Freedom exists for Thomas, if it exists at all, only as the power of choosing what is necessarily determined by the intellect to be choiceworthy, the various possibilities of choice being themselves presented by the understanding to the will. And though in a certain sense Divine foreknowledge is compatible upon his view with human freedom, the freedom with which men act is itself the product of Divine determination. Man is predetermined to act freely, and Divine foreknowledge foresees human actions as contingent. Duns Scotus on the other Greek sophers. (cf. Janet and Seailles, Hist. of Problems of Philosophy – Psychology, p. 324).

It was not until the rise of Christianity as an historical religion that the difficulty of reconciling a belief in human freedom with a belief in the Divine government of the world became hand is the great champion of indeterminism. Upon his view the intellect must always be subordinate to the will, and to the will belongs the power of complete self-determination. Morality in effect – to such an extreme position is he driven in his opposition to the Thomists – becomes the arbitrary creation of the Divine Will and in no sense depends for its authority upon rational principles or is a form of knowledge.

The modern treatment of the problem from Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Leibnitz down to Kant is too much inwoven into the metaphysical systems of individual great philoso phers to afford the possibility of detailed treatment in the present article. Reference should be made either to the individual philosophers themselves or to articles on metaphysics or on ethics. Hobbes is the great exponent of materialistic determinism. Ideals and volitions are upon his view ultimately movements of the brain. Will is identified with appetite or fear, the causes of which are to be found only in the external world. Descartes advocates a kind of freedom which is apparently consistent with forms both of determinism and indeterminism. He explains the possibility of error on the ground that the mind possesses the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae and can always refuse to affirm the truth of a conclusion drawn from premises which are not selfevident. And even when the presentations before the mind are so clear that assent to their truth cannot be refused, the possibility of assenting still rests with the will, which can refuse to attend to any presentation, or can refuse assent with the sole motive of proving its freedom. Spinoza is a convinced determinist regarding the will as necessarily determined by ideas. Extension, i.e. the spatial world, and the world of consciousness are alike attributes of the one sub stance which can only be called free in the sense of being determined by nothing but itself. Freedom in the moral sphere consists simply in the control of the passions by reason. Leibnitz retains this attenuated belief in moral freedom and combines with it a belief in the spontaneity of moral agents in the sense that they possess the power of acting and need no other principle of action save the laws of their own natures. But inasmuch as the agreement between the acts of Leibnitz’s monads is due to a divine pre-established harmony, and the theoretical contingency which in the abstract, i.e. as logically possible, can be predicated of their acts, is in practice non-existent, Leibnitz is in effect a determinist.

Locke’s treatment of the problem is in some respects more interesting than the theories of other English philosophers of his school. Freedom, according to Locke, belongs to the man, not to the will. If we will at all we are to that extent free, i.e. our actions express our purposes. If, on the other hand, we press Leibnitz’s objection, i.e. that such an argument is no answer to the question whether an act of will can be free in the sense that it is not determined by reasons presented by the understanding, Locke replies that the will is in effect determined by the uneasiness of desire, i.e. by the desire to avoid pain. Hume’s doctrine follows logically from his theory as to the nature of causality. If our belief in necessary connexion in the physical world is in reality an illusion, it follows that the opposition between freedom and necessity will be illusory also. On the other hand if our belief in the necessity of causal connexion is the result of custom, to custom will be due also the belief in a necessity governing human actions observable everywhere in men’s ordinary opinions and practice. Contrasted with this belief in necessity the supposition we have of freedom is illusory, and, if extended so as to involve a belief that men’s actions do not proceed from character or habitual disposition, immoral.

Kant’s theory of freedom is, perhaps, the most characteristic doctrine of his system of ethics. Distinguishing between two (cant. worlds, the sensuous and the intelligible, the pheno menal and the noumenal, Kant allows no freedom to the natural will determined by the succession of motives, desires and appetites which form the empirical and sensuous self. But in contrast with the phenomenal world governed by empirical laws Kant sets the noumenal and intelligible world in which by a timeless act of will man is free to accept the moral command of an unconditional imperative for no reason other than its own rational necessity as the deliverance of his highest nature. The difficulties of the Kantian system are mainly to be looked for in his account of the relation between the phenomenal and noumenal world.

In more recent times the controversy has been concerned either with the attempted proof of determinism by the advocates of psychological Hedonism, an attempt which at the present time is generally admitted to have failed; or with the new biological knowledge concerning the influence of heredity and environment in its bearing upon the development of character and the possibility of freedom. The great advance of biological knowledge in recent times though it has in no sense created a new problem (men have always been aware of the importance of racial or hereditary physical qualities in their influence upon human conduct) has certainly rendered the existence of complete individual freedom (in the sense in which it was advocated by older libertarians) in the highest degree unlikely. The advocates of freedom are content in the present day to postulate a relative power of influencing conduct, e.g. a power of controlling inherited temperament or subduing natural passion. Such a relative freedom, indeed, taking into account the admitted inviolability of natural laws, was from the very beginning all that they could claim.

But it was inevitable that the enormous advances made by the physical and other sciences in modern times should bring with them a reasoned attempt to bring the phenomena of consciousness within the sphere controlled by physical laws and natural necessity. There will never perhaps in any period of the world’s history be wanting advocates of materialism, who find in the sensible the only reality. But the materialism of modern times is more subtle than that of Hobbes. And the determinism of modern science no longer consists in a crude denial of the reality of conscious processes, or an attempt to explain them as only a sublimated form of matter and its movements; it is content to admit the relative independence of the world of consciousness, while it maintains that laws and hypotheses sufficient to explain material processes may be extended to and will be discovered to be valid of the changing sequences of conscious states of mind. Moreover, much of the apparent cogency of modern scientific determinist arguments has been derived from the unguarded admissions or timorous acquiescence of their opponents. It is not enough merely to repel the incursions of physiological science, armed with hypotheses and theories valid enough in their own sphere, upon the domain of consciousness. If the attack is to be finally repulsed it will be imperatively necessary for the libertarian to maintain that no full explanation of the physical universe can ever gain assent which does not take account of the reality and influence within the material world of human power of initiative and freedom. Of this necessity there is a growing consciousness in recent years, and no more notable exposition of it has been published than is contained in James Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism. Nor is there any lack of evidence of a growing dissatisfaction on the part of many physiologists with the complacent assumption that the methods of physical science, and particularly the conception of causal activity common to the sciences which study inorganic nature, can be transferred without further criticism to the examination of life and mind. Meanwhile the scientific onslaught upon the libertarian position has been directed from two chief quarters. It has been maintained, on the one hand, that any theory which presupposes a direct correspondence between the molecular movements of the brain, and the states of consciousness which accompany them must make the freedom of the will impossible. On the other hand it is asserted that quite apart from any particular view as to the relation between mind and body the existence of the freedom of the will is necessarily incompatible with the principle of the conservation of energy and is therefore in direct contradiction to many if not most of the assured conclusions of the physical sciences.

As regards the first of these two main contentions, it must suffice here to point out the main difficulties in which a determinist and especially materialist account of the relation between consciousness and the organic processes which accompany it appears to be involved. The arguments of thorough-going materialism can in most cases be met with a direct negative. No kind of evidence can be adduced sufficient to prove that consciousness is a secretion of the brain, an effect or even a consequent of material processes or modes of motion. No direct causal relationship between a molecular movement and a state of consciousness has ever been established. No physiologist has ever claimed the power to prophesy with any approach to accuracy the future mental states of any individual from an examination of his brain. And, though some kind of correspondence between the physical and conscious series of states has been observed and is commonly taken for granted in a number of instances, proof that entire correspondence exists is still wanting, and the precise kind of correspondence is left undetermined. Nevertheless, the belief that material processes must be held sufficient to account for material changes in the human organism as in all other regions of the material world, can be held quite independently of any particular theory as to the relation between mind and body, and in many of its forms is equally destructive of a belief in the freedom of the will. It is a belief, too, which is increasingly prevalent in modern science. The theory of psychophysical parallelism involves no doubt in the minds of the majority of its upholders the further assumption of some unity underlying both the physical and psychical series which may one day be discovered to be susceptible of scientific expression and interpretation. Certainly without some such assumption the hypothesis of an exact correspondence between the series described as parallel becomes, as Professor Ward has shown, unmeaning. And many scientific thinkers, while professing allegiance to a theory which insists upon the independence of each parallel series, in reality tacitly assume the superior importance if not the controlling force of the physical over the psychical terms. But a mere insistence upon the complete independence of the physical series coupled with the belief that its changes are wholly explicable as modes of motion, that the study of molecular physics is competent to explain all the phenomena of life and organic movements, is sufficient to eliminate the possibility of spontaneity and free origination from the universe. For if consciousness be looked upon as simply an epiphenomenon, an unaccountable appearance accompanying the succession of material changes, the possibility either of active interference by human volition at any point within the physical series or of any controlling or directing efficacy of consciousness over the whole set of material changes which accompany its activity becomes unthinkable. There are, nevertheless, serious difficulties involved in the supposition that the changes in the brain with which physiology and the biological sciences deal can be satisfactorily explained by the mechanical and mathematical conceptions common to all these sciences, or, indeed, that any of these organic changes is susceptible in the last resort of explanation derived from purely material premises. The phenomena of life and growth and assimilation have not been satisfactorily explained as mechanical modes of motion, and the fact that identical cerebral movements have not been discovered to recur makes scientific and accurate prediction of future cerebral changes an impossibility. But more convincing than most of the philosophical arguments by which the theories of psychophysical parallelism have been assailed is the fact that it runs counter to the plain evidence of the ordinary consciousness. No matter to what extent the unphilosophical thinker may be under the influence of materialistic presuppositions, he always recoils from the conclusion that the facts of his mental life have no influence upon his physical movements. Meaning, design and purpose are to him terms far more explanatory of his movements in the outer world than the mechanical and mathematical equivalents to which his actions will ultimately be reduced if the sciences should achieve their avowed purpose. To regard himself as a conscious automaton he can never be persuaded. Further, he finds in the series of antecedents and consequents capable of mathematical and spatial determination, which certain men of science present to him as their final account of his physical and psychical history, no real explanation of the facts: he is far more inclined to look for an explanation of the efficacy of causal changes in the categories of will and purpose for which they are a substitution.

Nor, finally, is the last defensive position of scientific determinism – the theory, namely, that the freedom of the will is incompatible with the doctrine of the conservation of energy – to be accepted without question. That doctrine, if it is to possess cogency as a proof of the impossibility of the libertarian position, must assume that the amount of energy sufficient to account for physical and psychical changes is constant and invariable in quantity, an assumption which no scientific investigator is competent to prove. A regulative principle which may possess great value when applied and confined to the comparatively abstract material of the mathematical and quasimathematical sciences is highly dangerous if extended to the investigation of living bodies. “In its present form, and since the development of the mechanical theory of heat, the principle of the conservation of energy certainly seems to apply to the whole range of physico-chemical phenomena. But no one can tell whether the study of physiological phenomena in general, and of nervous phenomena in particular, will not reveal to us, besides the vis viva or kinetic energy of which Leibnitz spoke, and the potential energy which was a later and necessary adjunct, some new kind of energy which may differ from the other two by rebelling against calculation” (Bergson, Time and Free Will, Eng. trans. by F. L. Pogson, pp. 151, 152).

It is, however, from the development of the scientific study of psychology more than from any other region of thought that light has been thrown upon the problem of freedom. The determinist presuppositions of psy chology (determinist because they involve the applica tion of the causal conceptions of modern science to mental phenomena) have in many instances in no way retarded the utilization of new information concerning mental processes in order to prove the reality of freedom. Bergson is perhaps the most notable instance of a philosopher fully conversant with psychological studies and methods who remains a convinced libertarian. But the contribution made by psychology to the solution of the problem has taken the form not so much of a direct reinforcement of the arguments of either of the opponent systems, as of a searching criticism of the false assumptions concerning conative processes and the phenomena of choice common alike to determinists and libertarians. It has already been pointed out that the problem as it presented itself to utilitarian philosophers could lead only to a false solution, depending as it did upon a wholly fictitious theory as to the nature of desire. There are still many traces to be found in modern psychology of a similar unreal identification of desire with will. But, nevertheless, the new light thrown upon the unity of the self and the more careful and accurate scrutiny made by recent psychologists of the phenomena of decision have rendered it no longer possible either for determinists to deny the fact of choice (whatever be their theory as to its nature) or for libertarians to regard the self or the will as isolated from and unaffected by other mental constituents and antecedents, and hence, by an appeal to wholly fictitious entities, to prove the truth of freedom. The self or the will can no longer be looked upon as possessing a kind of imperium in imperio, ” this way and that dividing the swift mind.” And if freedom of choice be a possibility at all, it must in future be regarded as the prerogative of a man’s whole personality, exhibited continuously throughout the development of his character, displayed to some extent in all conscious conative processes, though especially apparent in crises necessitating deliberate and serious purpose. The mistake of earlier advocates of determinism lay in the supposition that self-conscious moral action could be explained by the use of the same categories and upon the same hypotheses usually considered sufficient to explain the causal sequences observable in the physical world. Conduct was regarded as the result of interaction between character and environment; or it was asserted to be the resultant effect of a struggle between motives in which the strongest prevailed. And the libertarian critic had before him a comparatively easy task when he exhibited the complete interdependence of character and environment, or rather the impossibility of treating either as definite and fixed factors in a process explicable by the use of ordinary scientific categories.

It was not difficult to show that motives have meaning only with reference to a self, and that it is the self which alone has power to erect a desire into a motive, or that the attraction of an object of appetite derives much of its power from the character of the self to which it makes its appeal. What is possibly not so obvious is the extent to which libertarians have themselves been guilty of a similar fallacy. It is comparatively unimportant to the determinist whether the cause to which he attributes conduct be the self, or the will, or character, or the strongest motive, provided that each of these causes be regarded as definitely ascertainable and that its effects in sufficiently known circumstances be calculable. It is possible to treat will as a permanent cause manifesting itself through a series of sequent changes, and obedient to the laws which govern the development of the personality of the single individual.

And the libertarian, by his arguments showing that appeal must be made to an act of will or of the self in the explanation of the phenomena of choice, does nothing directly to disprove the truth of such a contention. If, how ever, it be argued by libertarians that no explanation is possible of the manner in which the self or the will makes its decisions and inclines to this motive or to that, while they still assert the independent existence of the self or will, then they are undoubtedly open to the retort of their opponents that upon such a theory no rational explanation of conduct will be possible. For to regard a particular decision as the effect of the “fiat” of a self or will unmotived and uninfluenced by the idea of a future object of attainment seems to be equivalent to the simple statement that the choice was made or the decision taken. Such a theory can prove nothing either for or against the possibility of freedom.

Moreover, many of the arguments by which the position of rigid libertarians of the older school has been proved untenable. have been advanced by moral philosophers, and by thinkers not always inclined to regard psychology with complete sympathy. The doctrine of self-determination, advocated by T. H. Green and idealist writers of his school, has little or nothing in common with the doctrine that the self manifests its freedom in unmotived acts of will. The advocates of self-determination maintain that conduct is never determined, in the sense in which, e.g. movements in the physical world are determined, because man in virtue of his self-consciousness has a power of distinguishing himself from, even while he identifies himself with, a purely natural object of desire; and this must always make it impossible to regard him as an object governed by purely natural forces. Consciousness and especially self-consciousness, can never be explained upon hypotheses adequate only to explain the blind working of the unconscious world. But the insistence of idealist writers upon the relation of the world of nature to conscious intelligence, and especially to a universal consciousness realizing itself throughout the history of individuals, rendered it alike impossible to deny altogether some influence of environment upon character, and to regard the history of individual willing selves as consisting in isolated and unconnected acts of. choice. Self-consciousness, if it be conceived as distinguishing itself from its past history or from the natural world, must be conceived also as in some sense related to the empirical self which has a history in time and to the natural organism in which it finds a home. It is the precise mode of this relation which idealist philosophers leave obscure.

Nor is that obscurity to any appreciable degree illuminated by the tendency also noticeable in idealist writers to find the true possession of freedom only in a self emancipated from the influence of irrational passion, and liberated by knowledge from the dominion of chance or the despotism of unknown natural forces. Here also psychology, by its elucidation of the important part which instinctive appetites and animal impulses play in the development of intelligence, still more perhaps by arguments (based largely upon the examination of hypnotic subjects or the phenomena of fixed ideas) which show the permanent influence of irrational or semi-rational suggestions or habits upon human conduct, has done much to aid and abet idealists in their contentions. It cannot in fact be denied that from one point of view human freedom is strictly relative, a possession to be won only after painful effort, exhibiting itself in its entirety only in supreme moments when the self is unswayed by habit, and out of full knowledge makes an individual and personal choice. Ideal freedom will be the supreme achievement of a self completely moralized. But the process by which such freedom is eventually to be gained must, if the prize is to be worth the having, itself exhibit the gradual development of a self which, under whatever limitations, possesses the same liberty of choice in its early stages as in its latest. And no theory which limits the exercise of freedom to the choice only of what is strictly good or rational can avoid the imputation of destroying man’s responsibility for the choice of evil.

But the most important point at issue between the opposing theories has remained throughout the history of the controversy, the morality or immorality of their respective solutions of the problem. The advocates of either theory must in the last resort appeal to the direct evidence of the moral consciousness. It remains to give a brief sketch of the arguments advanced on either side.

It has always been maintained by convinced libertarians that without a belief in the freedom of the will morality becomes unmeaning (see Determinism). Moreover, without a belief in the freedom of the will the conception of moral obligation upon which the existence of morality depends and from which all other moral terms derive their meaning loses its chief significance. What is opposed to obligation, or at least always distinguished from it, is that very domain of necessity within which determinists would bring the will. For even when the felt obligation is absolute, where the will is completely moralized, where it is inconceivable in the case of a good man that the act which he performs should be other than it is, there the obligation which he recognizes is an obligation to choose autonomously, and as such is distinguished from desire or appetite or any of the other alleged determinants of action. If the question be asked “Where is the evidence for this alleged freedom to choose between alternatives?” the appeal is always made to the witness of the moral consciousness itself. No one, it is said, who ever feels remorse for the committal of a wrong act can honestly avoid the admission that at the moment when the act was committed he could have acted otherwise. No one at the moment of action is ever aware that his will is being necessitated. What he is clearly conscious of is the power to choose. Any proof, in the scientific sense, that a man’s acts are due to his power of free initiative would be from the nature of the case impossible. For, inasmuch as scientific proof depends upon the evidence of causality, such efforts after scientific demonstration would end only by bringing either the man’s whole personality or some element in it within the sequence of the chain of natural causes and effects, under the domination of that natural necessity from which as a conscious being he is free. The science of morality must be content in its search for causes to recognize the rationality of choice as a real determining agent in human affairs. And no account of the psychology of human action which regards conduct as due to self-determination, but leaves open the question whether the self is free to choose is, so it is argued, capable of providing an adequate theory of the admitted facts of moral consciousness.

We must now consider the arguments by which determinists attack the position of their opponents and the evidence which they adduce to show that the freedom of the will is no necessary postulate for moral action. For thorough-going deter minism of the older type the dependence of morality upon freedom did not of necessity prove an obstacle.

Hedonistic psychology denied the libertarian hypothesis, but it denied also the absoluteness and intuitive character of moral obligation, and attached no validity to the ordinary interpretation of terms like “ought” and duty. Modern determinists differ from the earlier advocates of their theory in their endeavour to exhibit at least the compatibility of morality with the absence of freedom, if not the enhancement of moral values which, according to some of its advocates, follows upon the acceptance of the deterministic account of conduct.

If a coherent theory capable of giving an explanation of the ordinary facts of morality and not involving too violent a breach with the meaning of moral terms in their accepted usage were all that need be required of determinists in order to m reconcile the defenders of the moral consciousness to the loss of their belief in the will’s freedom, it would follow without question that the determinists have proved their case. Neither the deterrent nor the reformatory theories of punishment (q.v.) necessarily depend upon or carry with them a belief in the freedom of the will. On the contrary, a belief that conduct necessarily results upon the presence of certain motives, and that upon the application of certain incentives, whether of pain or pleasure, upon the presence of certain stimuli whether in the shape of rewards or punishments, actions of a certain character will necessarily ensue, would seem to vindicate the rationality of ordinary penal legislation, if its aim be deterrent or reformatory, to a far greater extent than is possible upon the libertarian hypothesis. Humanitarian moralists, who hesitate to believe in the retributive theory of punishment because, as they think, its aim is not the criminal’s future well-being but merely the vindication through pain of an outrage upon the moral law which the criminal need never have committed, might welcome a theory which urges that the sole aim of punishment should be the exercise of an influence determining the criminal’s future conduct for his own or the social good.

Moreover, the belief that the justice of punishment depends upon the responsibility of the criminal for his past offences and the admission of the moral consciousness that his previous wrong-doing was freely chosen carries with it, so it is argued, consequences which the libertarian moralist might be willing to accept with reluctance. For whatever may have been the character of the individual in the past, it is possible upon the libertarian view that by the exercise of his freedom he has brought about in himself a complete change of character: he may be now the exact opposite in character of what he was then. Upon what grounds, therefore, shall we discriminate between the justice of punishing him for what he was at a previous period in his life and the injustice of forgiving him because of what he is in the present? While if the deterrent and reformatory theories alone provide a rational end for punishment to aim at then the libertarian hypothesis pushed to its extreme conclusion must make all punishments equally useless. For no punishments can prevent the individual from becoming a person of whatsoever character he chooses or from committing acts of whatsoever moral quality he determines to prefer. A similar line of argument would lead to the conclusion that the conception of the state as an educating, controlling and civilizing agency involves the belief that individual citizens can be influenced and directed by motives which have their origin in external suggestion, i.e. that the determinist theory alone provides a rational basis for state activity of whatever kind.

It might, however, be thought that whatever be the compatibility of theories of punishment or of the activity of the state as a moralizing agency with determinism, to reconcile the R denial of freedom with a belief in the reality of remorse or penitence will be plainly impossible. Nevertheless there is no tendency on the part of modern determinists to evade the difficulty. They argue with considerable cogency that determinism is very far from affording any ground for believing in the impotence of will. The belief that our actions have been determined in the past carries with it no argument that they will be of a like character in the future. Though in the future as in the past they must be equally determined, yet the forces that will determine their character in the future may be as yet unanalysed and unapparent. No man can exhaust by introspective analysis the hidden elements in his personality. The existence of feelings of remorse and penitence testify to the presence in the individual of motives to good conduct which, if acted upon and allowed full scope and development, may produce a complete change of character. Determinism is not necessarily the logic of despair. Moreover, in a certain sense the very feelings of remorse and penitence which are the chief weapons in the libertarians’ armoury testify to the truth of the determinists’ contention. For they are the natural and logical consequence of the acts which the penitent deplores. Such feelings follow the committal of acts of a certain character in a consciousness sufficiently moralized as inevitably as pain in the natural world follows upon the violation of one of nature’s laws. And they would lose a great part of their significance if they did not testify to the continued existence in a man’s personality of motives and tendencies likely to influence his conduct in the future as they have already influenced it in the past. Nor is it possible to give any rational explanation of the idea of responsibility itself upon indeterminist assumptions. For to hold a person to be a responsible agent is to believe that he possesses a certain fixity and stability of character. Freedom in the sense of complete liberty of choice would seem to lead to the conclusion that free agents are irresponsible, unaccountable. The truth seems to be that throughout the history of the controversy the chief arguments for either side have been provided by the extreme and exaggerated statements to which their opponents have been driven in the presentation of their case. So long as libertarians contend that what alone possesses moral value is unmotived choice, acts of will of which no explanation can be given save the arbitrary fiat of individual selves at the moment of decision, it is not difficult for determinists to exhibit the absurdities to which their arguments lead. It can easily be shown that men do as a matter of fact attach moral adjectives to environment, temperamental tendencies, natural endowments, instinctive desires, in a word to all or most of those forces moulding character, from which, according to libertarians, the individual’s freedom of choice should be clearly distinguished and separated, and to which it can be and is frequently opposed. While it is not easy to avoid the suspicion that a choice of which nothing can be predicated, which is guided by no motive, influenced by no desire, which is due neither to the natural display of character nor to the influence of environment, is either merely fortuitous or the product of a philosophical theory.

But, as has been already suggested, the libertarian argument by no means necessarily leads to such extreme conclusions. The libertarian is not pledged to the belief that acts which alone exhibit real freedom are isolated acts which depend upon a complete change of character, a change which is in no sense continuous with, and is in no kind of relation to, the series of successive changes which make up an individual’s mental and moral history. It is true that a consistent advocate of indeterminism must deny that the will is determined by motives, and must admit that no reason can finally be given for the individual’s choice beyond the act of choice itself. .For to give a reason for choosing (where “reason” is not merely equivalent to the determinists’ “cause” or “necessary antecedent”) would simply be to find the explanation of the individual’s choice in some previous decision. Moral conduct is conduct which follows upon the choice of ends, and to give a reason for the choice of an end in any particular instance is either to explain the nature of the end chosen and thus to describe the choice (a process which can in no sense show that the act of choice was itself necessitated), or it is to find the ground of the particular decision in its relation to an end already chosen. But whatever be the nature of the end chosen the libertarian is not concerned to deny that it must possess a fixed determinate character. If duty be chosen as opposed to pleasure the opposition between duty and pleasure is a necessary one. The recognition of such a necessary opposition is involved in the determinate act of choice. But the choice itself is neither necessary nor determined. The belief that libertarianism denies the binding force of habit or the gradual development of unchecked tendencies in character depends upon a similar misconception. The continuity of a man’s life and purposes would be equally apparent whether he habitually performed the same acts and made the same decisions in virtue of his freedom of choice or as the product of necessary forces moulding his character in accordance with fixed laws. Just as the phenomena of sudden conversion, complete revolutions of character occurring to outward appearance in a momentary space of time, are no valid argument against determinism – they may be due to the sudden emergence of elements in life and character long concealed – so what looks like the orderly and necessary development of a character growing and exhibiting its activity in accordance with fixed laws may in reality be due to innumerable secret struggles and momentous decisions, acts of choice of which only the results are outwardly apparent. The ends which at any moment the individual is free to choose or reject possess a determinate character: their existence or non-existence as possibilities is also to a very large extent determined for him. No man can choose to become whatsoever he will, for the ends which he can accomplish are restricted in number as well as definite in quality. But the real strength of the libertarian position is to be found in the fact that consciousness is capable of distinguishing ends at all. Whenever, for example, there is an admission on the part of any individual that in any previous act he made the attainment of pleasure his end rather than the performance of duty, there is also a tacit admission that he might have acted otherwise. And the existence of penitence and remorse is not merely a sign of the emergence in consciousness of elements in character nobler than and opposed to those tendencies which once held sway. They are feelings which are incapable of coming into being at all save when coupled with the judgment, “I ought to have acted otherwise because I possessed the power.” The same argument holds good concerning our feelings with regard to the justice or injustice of punishing a criminal if we believe that his will was determined. It may be politic or expedient to inflict pain upon a criminal in order either to effect an alteration in his character or to deter him or others from future performance of acts of a certain character. But even with regard to the expediency of such punishments we may have doubts. For the very argument from the undeveloped possibilities of each man’s character by which the determinist proves the compatibility of his theory with the phenomenon of sudden conversion and the like is sufficient also to prove that the state can never be sure that the punishments which it inflicts upon the individual will have the effect upon his character and conduct which it desires. It may be replied that experience makes it reasonably certain that the infliction of certain penalties will produce acts of a certain character and that the influence of certain incentives upon conduct may be established as reasonably probable by induction. But when the data are admittedly so uncertain is a valid inductive argument of such a character possible? And even if it were what would be its bearing upon the justice or injustice of inflicting punishments at all? The unsophisticated moral consciousness will still consider it unjust to punish a man for deeds of which he could not avoid the performance, and regard the alleged desire to produce in his future life consequences favourable to himself or society as beside the mark and irrelevant to the question at issue.

At the moment of action the individual invariably regards himself as free to choose between alternatives. This immediate consciousness of freedom persists upon another occasion even though subsequent reflection upon conduct should lead the individual to regard himself as determined at the very moment when he was aware of himself as free. It is this immediate consciousness of the power of choosing between alternatives which the determinist finds so difficult to explain. He may regard it as an illusion, and attempt to prove the incompatibility of our consciousness of freedom with the facts of existence and the nature of the world. But, in ordinary cases of illusion, once let the reason for the illusion be discovered, and there is no longer the possibility of our being longer deceived. The phenomena which deceived us may continue to persist, but they no longer persist as illusory: the appearance which deceived us is seen in its true nature, even though it should still retain those characteristic marks or signs of reality which hitherto we regarded as significant of a nature which we now no longer believe it to possess. But can it be maintained that the same truth holds good of our consciousness of freedom? Is it possible to hold that determinist arguments are of so convincing a character as to enable us to perceive at the moment of action the untrustworthy nature of our consciousness that we are free to choose between alternatives and to grasp beneath the appearance the underlying necessity which rules our wills ? Our actual consciousness of freedom is not seriously disputed. And though reflection upon conduct may lead us to suppose that our past acts were determined, that desire of pleasure or the wish to avoid pain controlled our wills, the unphilosophical observer interprets, in offenders against morality, such arguments as a mere excuse. Moreover, remorse and penitence are witnesses in the wrongdoer to the truth of the interpretation. On the other hand we have no such immediate consciousness of the necessity which is said to control our wills. We sharply distinguish that freedom which is the prerogative of human action from the necessary causation discoverable in nature. Within the domain of consciousness introspective analysis is unable to discover those chains of necessary sequences which it is the province of science to investigate in the physical world. And until the determinist can successfully explain to us how in a world obeying throughout its history necessary laws and limited in its nature to the exhibition of causal sequences the consciousness of freedom could ever have arisen, we may be content to trust the immediate affirmation of our moral selves.

For modern discussions of the problem consult Lotze, Microcosmus, i. 256 seq., English trans. Martineau; Study of Religion, vol. ii. bk. iii. chap. 2; Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism; Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. ii. bk. iii.; Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, bk. iv. chap. 4; McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, v.; Shadworth Hodgson, The Philosophy of Experience, iv. 118 seq.; Galloway, Studies in the Philosophy of Religion; Bergson, Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience; James, The Will to Believe; Fonsegrive, Essai sur le libre arbitre; Renouvier, Les Dilemmes de la metaphysique pure; Boutroux, La Contingence des lois de la nature; Noel, La Conscience du libre arbitre; Boyce Gibson, Essay in Personal Idealism on “The Problem of Freedom.” (H. H. W.)

Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 Edition